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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Putin's PR blitz 
In the lead up to the G8 summit in St. Petersburg, President Vladimir Putin made 
the media rounds, sitting  for interviews with foreign media outlets.  The tone of 
his appearances was generally smooth, showing the polish applied perhaps by 
western political technologists, but he veered occasionally toward smug 
satisfaction and glibly dropped one-liners, perhaps most notably at Vice 
President Dick Cheney's expense.  The Russian team also chose an odd path of 
baiting some of its G8 cohort with throwbacks to a proxy war past and veiled 
charges of imperialism. 
 
While Putin's remarks on NBC's Today Show about VP Cheney's "unfortunate 
shot while hunting" garnered much attention (and are likely to have played well to 
the audience for which they were intended), (1) the tenor of his answers to 
interviewer Matt Lauer's questions certainly revealed Putin's preparation for and 
comfort with the criticism that seemed to be reaching critical mass before the G8. 
(2)  When asked specifically about the contention that "Russia does not 
represent the ideals of the G8 family of countries," Putin quipped:  "I am pleased 
that we have our critics because it would be worse if everyone voted 
unanimously, like at Communist Party congresses during the Soviet era." (3) 
 
Putin's reminder of the Soviet past certainly was not accidental.  Another element 
of the Russian summit publicity was to remind the world that Russians had rid 
themselves of the Soviet system, and they therefore are not beholden to the west 
for their freedom.  The West did not win the Cold War, and Russia did not lose 
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the Cold War; it simply pulled its players from the field, forfeiting but a few 
matches.  
 
Among the Cold War era themes that Putin did raise however, was a testy take 
on western criticisms of Russia's efforts at democratization as neo-colonial 
interference: 
 
"[I]f we go back 100 years and look through the newspapers, we see what 
arguments the colonial powers of that time advanced to justify their expansion 
into Africa and Asia.  They cited arguments such as playing a civilizing role, the 
particular role of the white man, the need to civilize 'primitive peoples.' We all 
know what consequences this had.  If we replace the term 'civilizing role' with 
'democratization,' then we can transpose practically word for word what the 
newspapers were writing 100 years ago to today's world and the arguments we 
hear from some of our colleagues on issues such as democratization…." (4) 
 
The results of the G8 summit seem both a disappointment and a boon to Russia.  
There was no decision on WTO, but neither did criticism of its internal or external 
activities dominate the coverage.  
 
Sovereign democracy 
Kremlin strategist Vladislav Surkov recently addressed criticism of Russia's 
democratic "backsliding" by launching his own campaign to promote the concept 
of "Sovereign Democracy."  In a pre-summit press briefing, Surkov expounded 
on the concept, bandied about Kremlin circles for some time, that countries take 
their own, often unique, paths to democratic development.  Surkov chose to 
assert Russia's right to find its own political way without foreign state interference 
or criticism of its choices, differentiating between "sovereign" and "controlled" 
democracies: 
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"A controlled democracy is a model which is forcefully imposed by certain 
influential centres by hook or by crook.  It is not effective because it is imposed 
from the outside." (5) 
 
A sovereign democracy, on the other hand, allows for freedom of choice within 
the state that is developing its own democracy: "while building an open society, 
we do not forget that we are a free society, and we do not want to be managed 
from the outside." (6)  More specifically, "a country's culture and the speed of 
implementing reforms" are critical elements to Surkov's (somewhat narrow) 
concept of sovereign democracy. (7) 
 
It is difficult to argue with the general principle that true democratic development 
best occurs from the inside out, rather than through the imposition of a foreign 
state's institutions, norms or directives.  However, Surkov's timing and President 
Putin's defensive comments ahead of the G8 summit suggest an orchestrated 
campaign to prevent issues such as the restriction of press freedoms, rollback of 
regional elections and emasculation of Russia's legislative institutions from 
dominating discussions.  While they do seem inappropriate topics for state-to-
state contacts, such as the G8 meeting, they are nonetheless still fair game for 
journalists, scholars, and other concerned individuals and groups (yes, even 
NGOs). 
 
Official US response to the assertion of sovereign democracy has been 
somewhat ambivalent.  There is some confusion as to US President Bush's 
opinion on the matter:  Some reports claim that he dismissed the idea of 
"sovereign democracy" in remarks at the Other Russia forum, when speaking 
with a member of Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Open Russia (8); other reports suggest 
that the president instead concurred that "democracy in Russia "will be a 
Russian-style democracy"." (9) 
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Vladislav Surkov, luckily, had even more intriguing concepts to propose before 
the G8 summit, including a recommendation, during a speech entitled, "The 
Economy of a Sovereign Democracy: How Can Russia Grow Faster?" that 
Russia should take a cue from Che Guevarra and, paraphrasing some of Che's 
remarks on foreign capital, suggested to the United Russia audience that they 
assist in safeguarding Russia's economy from foreign capital. (10) 
 
Chaika makes his mark 
The new Russian Procurator-General, former Justice Minister Yuri Chaika, has 
set about a crucial initial task—replenishing the staff of the prosecutor's office.  
Sergei Fridinsky has been named the new Chief Military Prosecutor and Yuri 
Semin is the new prosecutor for Moscow. (11)  Chaika reportedly plans to 
replace roughly half the deputy prosecutors of the Ustinov era, choosing primarily 
from a pool of St. Petersburg siloviki. (12)  If Chaika's appointments proceed as 
predicted and Putin were to depart office in 2008, as currently mandated by the 
Constitution, at least he could count on friendly cadres in the prosecutor's office. 
 
Capital city of the north? 
The G8 summit did provide President Putin with another opportunity to showcase 
his hometown of St. Petersburg, an occasion he clearly relished.  More 
interesting however, is the apparent decision to move Russia's Constitutional 
Court to St. Petersburg, a decision that has reignited the rumors of a Putin plan 
to move the Russian capital north.  Putin certainly has taken several 
opportunities to host international events in the more aesthetically pleasing City 
of the North, and certainly prefers to choose his associates predominately from 
that region. 
 
One thing is clear:  The Chairman of the Constitutional Court, Valeri Zorkin, is not 
pleased with the idea of moving north:  "This is a political issue.  If the 
motherland orders so, we shall obey.  Should there be such a political decision, 
the Court will move to the Sverdlovsk Region." (13) 
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Source Notes: 
 
(1) President Putin's Interview with NBC Television Channel (USA), 12 Jul 06 via 
www.kremlin.ru. 
(2) In fact, the criticisms did not quite reach a fever pitch, as developments 
around the world, and in the Middle East in particular, took center stage in 
reports about the summit.  It is not difficult to imagine reporters being forced to 
dump stories about unemployed journalists who were critical of Putin or the 
dictatorial behavior of local (unelected) governors. 
(3) Interview with NBC, ibid. 
(4) President Putin's Interview with TF-1 Television Channel (France), 12 Jul 06 
via www.kremlin.ru. 
(5) ITAR-TASS new agency Moscow in Russian, 28 Jun 06 and RIA-Novosti in 
Russian, 28 Jun 06; BBC Monitoring International reports via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) "Bush downplays 'Sovereign Democracy' at Putin's Barbecue," by Pavel 
Baev, 17 Jul 06 Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation via 
www.jamestown.org. 
(9) Vedomosti, 17 Jul 06, pp. A1-A2; What the Papes Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic. 
(10) "Let's be like Che Guevara," by Elena Runeva and Anna Nikolayev, 
Vedomosti, 12 Jul 06; WPS via Lexis-Nexis Academic.  Che Guevarra frequently 
railed against the dangers of foreign capital, notably during an address to 
theUnited Nations Conference on Trade and development in Geneva, 
Switzerland, March 24, 1965 when he commented: "It must be made crystal clear 
that foreign capital investment dominating any country's economy, the 
deterioration in terms of trade, the control of one country's markets by another, 
discriminatory relations, and the use of force as an instrument of persuasion, are 
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a danger to world trade and world peace."  Guevarra's remarks at the conference 
are very pointed and constitute a "call for justice" on the part of the 
developing/socialist world versus the capitalist/developed west.  Surkov's use of 
this rhetoric may signal an extremely hypocritical appeal to the lesser developed 
countries and an a very unwelcome development in general. 
(11) "Chaika gathers his flock," by Kseniya Solyanskaya, 6 Jul 06, gazeta.ru; 
OSC Translated Excerpt via World News Connection (WNC). 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) Interfax, 3 Jul 06; OSC Transcribed Text via WNC.  Zorkin made these 
remarks while in the Sverdlovsk Region. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
“Liquidate the killers” 
On June 3, four Russian diplomats in Iraq, named as Fyodor Zaytsev, Rinat 
Aglyulin, Anatoli Smirnov and Oleg Fedosseyev were kidnapped by insurgents 
while their car was traveling through Mansour, a district of Baghdad just outside 
the “Green Zone.” A fifth diplomat, Vitali Titov, was killed during the attack on 
their vehicle. (1)  
    
Within days, a group calling itself “The Mujaheddin Shura Council” took 
responsibility for the kidnappings. In a statement posted on a jihadist website, the 
group threatened to kill its hostages unless Russia withdrew from Chechnya and 
released all Muslim prisoners from its jails within a 48 hour period. (2)  Russia’s 
response to the kidnappings was to issue a statement, through Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov, pleading for the diplomats’ release, emphasizing that Russia was 
“a sincere friend of the Iraqi people,” and noting that Russia had been opposed to 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq. (3)   
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On 21 June, the kidnappers issued a statement indicating that the diplomats 
would be killed due to Russia’s failure to accede to their demands. Five days 
later, a video was released that appeared to show the execution of at least two of 
the hostages. The statement release alongside the video noted that the 
executions would “serve as a lesson…to those who would still defy the 
Mujaheddin and dare to set foot in the land of the two rivers,”(4)  as well as 
“revenge for our brothers and sisters for the torture and killing they receive at the 
hands of the Russian infidel.” (5)  
    
President Vladimir Putin responded to the killings by ordering Russia’s Special 
Services to “find and destroy the criminals who committed this evil deed.” (6)  
FSB Chief Nikolai Patrushev responded to Putin’s instruction by stating that the 
FSB will “make every effort to ensure that the terrorists involved in the 
killing…will answer for their actions.” (7)  A $10 million reward is to be given for 
any information leading to a “result” in the hunt for the responsible terrorists. (8)  
    
Several prominent defense analysts in Russia have commented on Putin’s  
“liquidation order.” Sergei Goncharov, Head of the Veterans of Alfa Group, 
believes that the Security Services are capable of carrying out Putin’s order, 
given precise intelligence. (9)  Goncharov’s opinion has been seconded by 
Anatoli Tsyganok, head of the Military Forecasting Center in Moscow. (10)  Pavel 
Felgenhauer also has commented on Putin’s order, stating that “We can do 
nothing…without the cooperation of the Iraqi secret services and those of the 
coalition…this declaration is an obvious imitation of those of Bush after 
September 11.” (11)  Given the present state of decay in Russia’s armed forces, 
as well as the evidence of botched past operations, Felgenhauer’s statement is 
likely to constitute the most accurate evaluation. Whether or not Russia’s Special 
Services can or cannot carry out Putin’s orders may be, in this instance, a 
secondary question. The larger issue is the brewing turf war between the FSB, 
the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the GRU. 
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SVR & GRU vs. FSB turf battle? 
Last month, it was announced that the Duma would consider a bill providing the 
FSB with the authority to carry out anti-terrorist activities outside Russia. Given 
the status of the GRU and SVR as the agencies responsible for foreign 
operations under Russian law, it seems evident that the bill was designed as the 
"first step" in an effort to reunify Russia’s intelligence agencies under a single 
command. (12)   
 
The new anti-terrorism Bill was passed by the Upper and Lower Houses of the 
Duma respectively on 5 and 7 July.  
    
The fact that a turf battle between Russia’s intelligence agencies is now raging 
has become increasingly clear in the last few weeks. First, a 5 July Izvestia 
article sourced to Sergei Shestov, CEO of a Special Services Veterans 
organization claimed that an SVR Special Operations Team called “Zaslon,” 
which is “as well equipped as the legendary Alfa and Vympel commandos,” 
would carry out the liquidation order. (13)  Several days later, Defense Minister 
Sergei Ivanov confirmed a statement apparently made days earlier by Chief of 
Staff Yuri Baluyevsky, to the effect that the best special forces operatives of the 
Main Intelligence Department of the armed forces (GRU) were already in Iraq, 
tasked with destroying the terrorists responsible for the slayings. (14)  If all of 
these statements are to be taken at face value, Russia’s three main intelligence 
agencies are now competing over the same mission.  
    
It should be noted that the new anti-terrorism bill is not a response to the killings 
in Iraq. The bill was first presented to the Duma for consideration in March of this 
year. (15)  The diplomats’ deaths and "retribution order" form merely the umbrella 
under which the three intelligence agencies are fighting either to expand or retain 
their territory. The GRU's and SVR’s future status may now hinge on their 
success in hunting down the embassy killers. 
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Update: “Provokatsiya” along Georgian border?  
Late in May, the FSB announced the future professionalization of the Border 
Guard Service. Under the auspices of promoting the changes, FSB Director 
Patrushev traveled to the Georgian border to “familiarize” himself with the border 
strengthening program. Although “familiarization” was the public explanation for 
Patrushev’s visit, his presence also may have been designed to send a message 
to Tbilisi regarding Georgia’s discussion of NATO membership and of leaving the 
CIS. (16)  
    
On 27 June, President Putin stated categorically that Russian "peacekeepers" 
would remain in Abzkhazia and South Ossestia “regardless of provocations.” (17)  
In the last few weeks, this statement has taken on an ominous character. On 12 
July, ITAR-TASS reported that Russian troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
had been placed on a “heightened alert state.” (18)  Apparently, an FSB 
informant told his controllers that Georgian forces were planning a deception 
operation during the G8 Summit, involving the planting of bodies on South 
Ossetian territory. (19)  
    
Realistically, Georgia lacks the military capability to challenge Russia. As such, 
there are a number of possibilities regarding this story. First, Georgia plans to 
use a “deception campaign” to garner US sympathy during President Bush’s visit 
to St. Petersburg, or secondly—and more realistically—Patrushev’s border visit, 
Putin’s seemingly prophetic statement, and the FSB’s “warning” amount to an 
orchestrated disinformation campaign designed to allow Russia to claim 
“preemptive necessity,” and possibly gain US accession in anti-Tbilisi actions 
planned for the near future. 
 
Basayev's death  
On 10 July, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev apparently informed President Putin 
that Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev and several other militant leaders were 
killed during the course of a special operation. (20)  A day later, an FSB source in 
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the Southern Federal District claimed that Basayev had been killed by a targeted 
rocket strike, computed using the signal from his cell-phone. (21)  
   
Chechen rebel leaders have confirmed that Basayev was killed, but have denied 
that Russian forces were responsible. Bashir Aushev, Deputy Prime Minister of 
Ingushetia stated that Basayev was killed in the “accidental explosion of a truck 
carrying explosives,” not by Russian Special Forces. (22)  At this point in time, 
there would seem to be at least some evidence that Aushev’s claim is correct: 
Kommersant reported that the FSB only arrived at the scene of the explosion six 
hours after the fact. Moreover, Kommersant claimed that the “material evidence 
gathered by experts” showed that the militants had blown themselves up through 
“careless handling of explosives.” (23)  
    
Given this evidence, it seems clear that the FSB is claiming Basayev’s death as 
a “Special Operation” for its own ends: the organization needed a “success” after 
the Beslan debacle, and it needs political capital with the President if it is to be 
successful in its aim of recreating a “super agency” along the lines of the Soviet 
era KGB.  
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) “Russian Diplomats ‘To Be Killed,’” BBC News, 21 Jun 06 via 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hii/world/middle_east/5102532.stm.  
(2) “4 Russian Diplomats Kidnapped in Iraq Are Killed?” Pravda.ru, 26 Jun 06 via 
www.english.pravda.ru/hotspots/terror/26-06-2006/82491-Russian_kill-0.  
(3) “Russian Diplomats ‘To Be Killed,’” BBC News, Ibid. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) “4 Russian Diplomats Kidnapped in Iraq Are Killed?” Pravda.ru, Ibid. 
(6) “Putin Orders Liquidation of Baghdad Embassy Killers,” Agence France 
Presse, 28 Jun 06 via Lexis-Nexis.  
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(7) “Russian Security Services Head Vows To Avenge Death of Diplomats In 
Iraq,” Interfax News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 28 Jun 06; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis.  
(8) “Russian Security Service Chief Announces Reward For Iraq Killers,” NTV 
Mir, Moscow, in Russian, 30 Jun 06 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(9) “Russian Military Experts Comment on Putin’s Order To Find Killers of Iraq 
Envoys,” Ekho Moskvy Radio, 28 Jun 06; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(10) Ibid. 
(11) “Putin Orders Liquidation of Baghdad Embassy Killers,” Agence France 
Presse, 28 Jun 06 via Lexis-Nexis 
(12) The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Number 4 (Apr 06). 
(13) “The Zaslon Squad Will Seek The Embassy Hostage Killers,” Izvestia, 5 Jul 
06 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(14) “Russia Increases Anti-Terrorist Struggle,” WPS Observer, 10 Jul 06 via 
Lexis-Nexis.  
(15) “The Duma Will Unleash The FSB On The World,” Kommersant, 4 Jul 06 via 
Lexis-Nexis.  
(16) The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Number 4 (20 Apr 06)  
(17) Eurasia Insight, 27 Jun 06 via 
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062706.shtml 
(18) “Russian Peacekeepers In Ossetia On Alert After FSB Statement,” ITAR-
TASS, 12 Jul 06, OSC Translated Excerpt via World News Connection.  
(19) “Russia: FSB Informer Says Georgia Planning ‘Provocation’ on Eve of G8 
Summit,” Interfax, 12 Jul 06, OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(20) “Russia: FSB Reports Shamil Basayev Eliminated In Ingushetia,” Interfax, 
10 Jul 06, OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(21) “Source Says Russia’s FSB Located Basayev by Cell Phone Signal,” ITAR-
TASS, 11 Jul 06, OSC Transcribed Text via Lexis-Nexis.  
(22) “Top Chechen Warlord Dead: Russian Special Forces,” Agence-France-
Presse, 10 Jul 06 via Lexis-Nexis.  
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(23) “Russian Paper Gives Grisly Detail of Identification Process for Shamil 
Basayev,” Kommersant, 12 Jul 06 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Marisa Payne 
 
Odd man out? 
Now that Russia’s much-anticipated G8 presidency is winding down, the flaws of 
Russia’s current foreign policy have become more visible. According to Russia’s 
official G8 web site, G8 meetings are “designed to harmonize attitudes to acute 
international problems.” (1) However, the only of the "harmonized attitudes" 
visible at this summit was the clarification of the differences between Russia and 
the other G8 members. Calling this an “important result,” former British 
Ambassador to Russia and long-time summit attendee, Roderic Lyne, concluded, 
"Liberals in Russia worried that the summit would be seen as a seal of approval 
for repressive policies and that outsiders would be hoodwinked by expensive and 
cunning PR agencies. The reverse has been the case. The leaders arrived in St. 
Petersburg with an outpouring of criticism of Russia from media and political 
commentators throughout the Western world ringing in their ears." (2) 
 
The upsurge of violence in the Middle East only added to the list of contentions 
between Russia and the other members of the G8. While every member 
condemned Hezbollah for provoking the violence by kidnapping Israeli soldiers, 
Russia and France differed from other members of the G8 by placing some of the 
blame for the escalation of violence on Israel. Foreign Minister Lavrov told 
reporters, “This is a disproportionate response to what has happened, and if both 
sides are going to paint each other into a corner then I think that all this will 
develop in a very dramatic and tragic way.” (3) 
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President Bush refrained from calling for a cease-fire and condemned Hezbollah, 
calling it and its patrons the “root cause” of the current violence in the Middle 
East. (4)  He stressed that Hezbollah, which has made its home in Lebanon, 
must be seen as a client of Iran and Syria. (5)  British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
supported Bush’s statement. After hesitating for days whether to point fingers 
directly at Iran and Syria, Blair told reporters on 16 July, “There are those in the 
region, notably Iran and Syria, who do not want this process of democratization 
and negotiation to succeed...There has been a real hesitation to put the real truth 
of this situation.” (6) 
 
Lavrov, however, questioned statements about Hezbollah’s relations with Iran 
and Syria during a television interview with CNN. Speaking in English with a 
heavy Russian accent, Lavrov fielded reporter Wolf Blitzer’s questions regarding 
Hezbollah’s political and economic ties to Syria and Iran by acknowledging 
Hezbollah's provocations but refusing to accept Syria's and Iran's roles until “we 
see the facts.” (7) 
 
Foreign Minister Lavrov may have kept his statements vague for more than just 
simple concern for Iran and Syria – Russia has sold millions of dollars worth of 
weapons and technology to both countries. 
 
In late 2005, the international community came down hard on Putin for 
attempting to sell to Syria Iskander-E tactical missiles, which are said to be 
favorites of terrorists for their ease of operation and ability to transport. President 
Putin eventually gave in to international pressure, but Russia continues to send 
Strelets (SA-18) surface-to-air missiles to Damascus. (8) 
 
On 9 February, amid intense controversy surrounding Russia’s role in aiding 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Russia confirmed that it would sell twenty-nine Tor-
M1’s, low-altitude surface-to-air missiles, and two Pechora-2A systems, medium-
range surface-to-air missiles, to Tehran in exchange for $700 million. (9)  
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Russian officials have stipulated that the systems sold in this deal, which media 
outlets believe to have been brokered in December 2005, are to be used solely 
for defense purposes, but they might well serve as insurance against possible 
attempts to take out Iran’s potential nuclear weapons facilities. (10) 
 
The Middle East has long been an important region for Russian foreign policy. 
Not only is it potentially lucrative to broker arm’s deals with oil-rich countries like 
Iran, but Russia finds it politically valuable to pursue relations also with countries 
like Syria, which are not as oil-rich. As the successor to the USSR, Russia seems 
also intent upon claiming superpower status, which involves expanding beyond 
the role of being just a regional power. Today, in place of a Soviet ideologically-
driven zero-sum foreign policy there is an effort to enhance Russia's national 
interests. (11)  Yet to remain relevant amid various political and economic crises, 
Russian policymakers have all but ignored any long-term strategies in favor of 
short-term gains, as evidenced by the decision to supply arms to Syria and Iran 
without looking at the possible future consequences of those deals (e.g. 
"seepage" of the weapons into the hands of terrorist groups like Hezbollah). Until 
now, Moscow has been attempting to appear even-handed. Aside from the 
recent arms deals, Russia has held talks with Hamas while simultaneously 
maintaining normal relations  with Israel. President Putin fended off US Vice 
President Richard Cheney’s recent critique, sparring back at him during an 
interview with NBC’s Matt Lauer, (12) while maintaining a supposedly “solid 
friendship” with President Bush. (13) 
 
However, this week’s G8 summit has highlighted these discrepancies. On top of 
the differences of opinion on Syria’s and Iran’s role in the current violence in the 
Middle East, Russia also irked various other G8 members; it differed from the 
European majority in its failure to ratify the Energy Charter and it differed from 
the United States regarding its stance on Iran and its place in the WTO. (14) 
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On Iran, President Putin opposes UN sanctions, telling reporters, “We need to 
take efficient diplomatic steps that will not disrupt the delicate fabric of 
negotiations in the search for a mutually acceptable decision." (15) 
 
Russia’s new troubles regarding its WTO membership bode even worse for its 
foreign relations with the United States. On 4 July, Putin threatened to drop WTO 
rules if Russia was not admitted: "The conditions in which the Russian economy 
is functioning are much more open and more liberal than those in some countries 
that have already joined [the WTO]. And if we, for some reason, do not succeed 
in reaching a final agreement, we will, of course, revoke our commitments to 
some of the agreements that we have not only adopted but are also fulfilling 
without being a member of the organization." (16) 
 
Not only was Russia not admitted to the WTO during the G8 summit, but the 
United States remains the last hold-out (unless Georgia withdraws from its 
bilateral trade agreements following the recent Russian border closing). After 
negotiating for days over Russia’s WTO status, the United States ultimately 
decided to hold off on an official agreement because of certain stipulations about 
US meat exports to Russia. While Putin said the “difficulties” were not 
“unexpected,” (17)  other members of the Russian camp took this as a slight. 
Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin complained, “We are in the role of the 
younger brother for whom it’s harder, who is looked down upon.” (18)  Kudrin 
characterized Russia’s WTO status as “an economy class ticket for the price of 
1st class one.” (19) 
 
Clearly, the G8’s mission to “harmonize attitudes” on various issues did not go 
quite as planned for any of the members who refused to consider other options 
than those with which they arrived on the most contentious of items. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) “G8 History,” 17 Jul 06, Official Website of the G8 Presidency via 
en.g8russia.ru. 
(2) Lyne, Roderic, “Russia and the G8 Now That the Party Is Over,” The Moscow 
Times via www.themoscowtimes.com. 
(3) Abdullaev, Nabi, “Lavrov warns Israel of surge in violence, 14 Jul 06, Moscow 
Times via http://www.themoscowtimes.com. 
(4) Silva, Mark, “Blaming Syria and Iran,” 16 Jul 06, Chicago Tribune via  
http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) Landberg, Reed, “Blair Joins Bush in Blaming Iran, Syria Over Violence,” 16 
Jul 06, Bloomberg via http://www.bloomberg.com. 
(7) Transcipt of CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, 16 Jul 06, CNN via 
http://transcripts.cnn.com. 
(8) Yasmann, Victor, “Russia: Putin Pushes Greater Arms Exports,” 4 Apr 06, 
RFE/RL via  http://www.rferl.org. 
(9) Peuch, Jean-Christophe, “Russia: Moscow Confirms Missile-Systems Deal 
With Iran,” 10 Feb 06, RFE/RL via http://www.rferl.org. 
(10) “Foreign Relations,” 8 Dec 05, ISCIP Analyst via 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/col11/ed1104.html#foreign. 
(11) Bourtman, Ilya, “Putin and Russia’s Middle Eastern Policy,” June 2006, The 
Middle East Review of International Affairs via http://meria.idc.ac.il. 
(12) Hauser, Christine, “Putin Rips Cheney With Hunting Quip,” 12 Jul 06, New 
York Times via www.nytimes.com. 
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approach toward Putin,” 15 Jul 06, Washington Post via 
www.washingtonpost.com. 
(14) Boykewich, Stephen & Yablokova, Oksana, “Schisms emerge at Petersburg 
summit,” 17 Jul 06, The Moscow Times via www.themoscowtimes.com. 
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any lectures,” 17 Jul 06, The Moscow Times via www.themoscowtimes.com. 
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(16) “Russia to drop WTO trade rules if not admitted,” 4 Jul 06, AFP via 
www.rferl.org. 
(17) Korchagina, Valeria, “WTO talks founder over US meat exports,” 17 Jul 06, 
The Moscow Times via www.themoscowtimes.com. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Anastasia Skoybedo 
 
GEORGIA 
Lemon juice on a paper-cut 
Russian pressure on Georgia has been stimulated in the past few weeks by the 
G8 summit. Russia tried to prevent discussion of its political and economic 
relations with Georgia and the so-called frozen conflicts, while Georgia tried very 
hard to make its voice heard and its grievances addressed. Thus, in the weeks 
preceding the summit, the two countries have been involved in a diplomatic battle 
to influence the summit's agenda. In order to soften their relations and to create 
at least an appearance of improvement, or just simply to show the ability to 
negotiate, President Mikhail Saakashvili initiated a meeting with President 
Vladimir Putin on 13 June. (1)  This meeting was supposed to address questions 
regarding Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatism, as well as the recently 
imposed Russian embargo on Georgian food and wine. It began with an 
awkward and strenuous conversation in front of the journalists, ended behind 
closed doors and accomplished nothing. In relation to the conflicts, Saakashvili 
exclaimed: “We have nothing to give! No one will get a single piece of Georgia!” 
(2)  Putin, meanwhile,  spoke of referenda and patience. (3)  The economic 
sphere came out in better shape, with both presidents agreeing that economic 
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relations were “improving.” However, lack of elaboration, avoidance of key 
issues, such as the wine embargo, and no actual evidence of an improvement 
point to movement in a different direction. (4) 
 
On 7 July, Saakashvili travelled to the United States to meet President Bush, 
where they discussed the same questions that Saakashvili had tried to resolve 
with Putin. (5)  This meeting ended more successfully – Saakashvili received an 
assurance from President Bush that the Georgian “territorial question” will be 
brought up during the G8 summit, as will Russia's general relations with Georgia. 
(6)  Georgia did not try to conceal the fact that Saakashvilli's trip to US was “to 
have consolidated support at the G8 summit.”(7)  This posed understandable 
difficulties for the Russian plan to avoid discussing Georgia during the summit. 
Furthermore, preceding the US trip, Saakashvili denied any possibility of 
referenda in either breakaway region as a means of solving the conflicts. 
Saakashvili maintains that the territorial integrity of Georgia will be the foremost 
factor in any resolution, stating that “we will resolve the conflicts, we hope, 
together with Russia or without it.” (8)  Russia has insisted on a referendum as 
the most acceptable means of resolution, and Putin tried to impose this view on 
Saakashvili during his St. Petersburg visit. This was a double blow, for not only 
does Saakashvili wish to invite Western powers into a region that Russia 
considers its own sphere of influence, he also wanted to bring up this topic during 
the G8 summit and has full assurance of support from President Bush. 
 
On 8 July, Russia closed the only officially recognised checkpoint on the 
Georgian border for “repairs.” (9)  The Georgian side immediately branded this 
as a provocation and demanded an explanation and a set date for re-opening, 
while Russia refused to offer any explanation on the incident. (10)  In response, 
the Georgian Parliament intensified its efforts to end the mandate of Russian 
"peacekeepers" in South Ossetia and prevented a scheduled meeting of a Mixed 
Control Commission for the Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict by 
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detaining Ambassador Yuri Pavlov and commander of "peacekeeping" forces 
Valeri Evnevich twice at a checkpoint near Tskhinvali. (11) 
 
All these moves are going to have a detrimental effect on a meeting between the 
two countries planned for after the summit. Saakashvilli, however, emerges 
successful from this battle, for Georgia was discussed at the G8 summit, 
although Russia can take credit for minimizing the impact of that conversation. 
Putin did not allow this celebration to be spoiled. 
 
NORTH CAUCASUS 
Terrorists, thrice beheaded  
The assassination of Aslan Maskhadov in the spring of 2005 was a major blow to 
Chechen resistance, depriving it of an important icon. Since then, there have 
been no events of equal importance until this past month. These two eliminations 
of Chechen leaders by themselves might not have had such a large bearing, but, 
combined, they present rebels with a serious dilemma. For the first time they find 
themselves without any visible leaders, save for Doku Umarov, the recently 
named "President of Ichkeria" of the Chechen resistance. 
 
On 17 June, underground rebel president Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev was killed in 
what was swiftly deemed a successful special operation, organized to capture 
Sadulayev. (12)  Immediately after the assassination, as contradictory and 
confusing accounts began to emerge and rumors grew, Ramzan Kadyrov stated 
that Sadulayev was caught while preparing another terrorist attack. (13)  It is well 
known that Sadulayev, as a true follower of Maskhadov, opposed terrorist attacks 
and violence against civilians. Moreover, Sadulayev has never been incriminated 
in any of the terrorist attacks. Kadyrov also claimed that Sadulayev was “sold” for 
US $55, while local sources testified that there were reports of “suspicious 
bearded men” hiding in the basement, but no knowledge that one of them was 
Sadulayev himself, (14) pointing to the fact that the special “Sadulayev operation” 
might not have taken place. Furthermore, such an operation was unlikely simply 
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because Russian leadership has been ignorant of Sadulayev’s precise role in 
Chechen resistance ever since he assumed the post of President. It has 
perceived him as subservient to Basayev and quite unimportant, while, in fact, he 
had strong influence on Basayev, and was held in high regard among the rebels. 
In addition, Sadulayev organised the so-called Caucasian Front, which finalised 
the spread of Chechen armed resistance to other areas of the North Caucasus. 
Hence, a “special operation” evaporates and becomes rather a stroke of luck, 
which apparently occurred during a police check of a suspicious building. 
 
After the death of Sadulayev, Doku Umarov was promoted to President of 
Ichkeria, while Shamil Basayev was named Prime Minister; several days later, 
Basayev himself was killed in another dubious "special operation." (15)  Basayev 
was reported to have died on 10 July when he was blown up in an Ingushetian 
village of Ekazhevo by a detonator placed by the FSB in a truckload of 
explosives that he allegedly had received from abroad. (16)  The circumstances 
of his death remain sketchy at best, with many rumoured versions of events. Why 
have there been so many contradictory accounts and no single official account? 
Who exactly carried out the operation? And why did Basayev require a truckload 
of explosives from abroad when he was perfectly content using Russian 
ammunition in the past? These are only a few of the questions that remain 
unanswered. 
 
Thus, Doku Umarov remains the only known leader of the Chechen resistance, 
and Russia is rejoicing over this success. However, there are several factors that 
cause serious concern for everyone (except the Russian government, which is 
too busy congratulating itself). First, there is a whole generation of young fighters 
who have grown up during the war and have no memory of Chechnya in 
peacetime, most of whom are unknown to the “upper echelons;” there might be 
more than one potential successor to Basayev among them. Second, the 
insurgency already has spread to other republics, and Sadulayev’s official 
Caucasian Front exemplifies this reality. Chechnya’s status as the focus of 
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Caucasian resistance has been diminished in recent years, so even if the 
Chechen branch is completely eradicated, it will not stop the larger process that 
is underway. Third, if Doku Umarov were killed and Akhmed Zakayev were 
extradited by the UK (which seems to be Russia’s goal), there would be no 
relatively moderate leaders of the resistance left. If Russia really wants to bring 
peace to the region, it has to act now, while Umarov and Zakayev are alive and 
able to negotiate. Although Russian policy has eschewed this approach, Russia 
may have to accept that new, young Chechen leaders might not want to discuss 
a peaceful solution. Russia has been successful thus far in its anti-terrorist 
campaign. However, the actions that Russia does or does not take now will show 
whether it is truly committed to settling the conflict. At the moment, Russia is 
wasting valuable time and resources, and continues to suffer from the 
nearsightedness that has plagued its policies in the Caucasus for a very long 
time. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Back in the CSTO – Uzbekistan returns to the fold 
On June 23 at a meeting of the Collective Security Council of the CSTO 
(Collective Security Treaty Organization) in Minsk, Russian President Vladimir 
Putin announced that the Uzbek government had “lifted its moratorium on active 
work within the Collective Security Treaty Organization” and now should be 
considered a full member of the organization. (1)  Uzbekistan was one of the first 
states to sign the CIS Collective Security Treaty in May 1992, only to suspend its 
membership in 1999 and join the GUAM alliance (Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and 
Moldova) instead, in an effort to distance itself from Russia. (2)  The Uzbek 
government withdrew from GUAM in June 2002 (3) and in recent years has 
turned away from the US and Western Europe and started building a closer 
relationship with Russia.  US dissatisfaction with the slow pace of political and 
economic reform in Uzbekistan already had caused relations to cool somewhat. 
(4)  However, Washington’s sharp criticism of the Uzbek government’s harsh 
response to the May 2005 demonstrations and civil unrest in Andijon (5) and 
repeated calls for the Uzbek government to permit an independent, international 
investigation of the incident sent US-Uzbek relations into an acute downward 
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spiral from which they have yet to recover.  Subsequently, Uzbekistan decided to 
close the US airbase in Termez, depriving American military forces of one 
staging area for their operations in Afghanistan. 
 
As its relationship with Washington began stalling, Uzbekistan started bolstering 
its ties with Russia, signing in June 2004 a strategic partnership treaty, which 
called for greater political and economic cooperation, particularly in the sphere of 
energy resources.  The Uzbek government was so eager to move forward with 
the development of its energy resources that a production-sharing agreement 
between Uzbekneftegaz and LUKoil to develop Uzbekistan’s southwestern gas 
fields was signed the same day.  The two sides also pledged to work together to 
create a regional security system in Central Asia. (6)  In November 2005, 
Uzbekistan went one step further by entering into an alliance with Russia in 
which each of the two countries committed itself to provide military aid to the 
other in case of an act of aggression by a third country.  The agreement also 
gave each side the right to use the other’s military bases and “other facilities.” (7)  
Now, less than a year later, Uzbekistan has rejoined the CSTO, thereby 
committing itself to defend not just Russia, but all of the other members of the 
treaty organization (Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan).  By joining the CSTO, the Uzbek government also has granted the 
other member states the right to weigh in on decisions regarding the stationing of 
military personnel from non-CSTO states on Uzbek soil, which, at first glance, 
would seem a particularly egregious surrender of its rights as a sovereign state.  
Fortunately, thus far, the provision of the CSTO charter which requires 
“consultations” with the other members whenever any one of them wants to allow 
the deployment of non-CSTO troops or facilities on its territory (8) has not 
received so much as lip service (there are Indian and French troops stationed in 
Tajikistan, US troops in Kyrgyzstan, and German troops in Uzbekistan; none of 
these troop deployments were discussed within the CSTO).  (9)  However, 
should Moscow decide to flex its not inconsiderable military muscles and insist 
on stationing Russian troops and permanent military facilities in the CSTO states 
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as part of the consolidation and reorganization process that it wants to 
implement, (10) then the CSTO’s Central Asian members might find themselves 
ceding control over their own military and security forces to Moscow, and with it, 
full control over much of their own foreign policy. 
 
President Karimov undoubtedly is expecting to reap both economic and military 
benefits from Uzbekistan’s re-entry into the CSTO, perhaps hoping that Russia 
now will shoulder the financial burdens involved in training and equipping 
Uzbekistan’s border troops and internal security forces.  He also most likely 
expects that Uzbekistan’s membership in both the CSTO and Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEc) will open more doors for investment and trade between all 
the member countries.  However, judging by his comments at a post-summit 
press conference, the Uzbek president’s greatest expectation seems to be that 
by rejoining the CSTO, his country now will receive the international attention and 
respect that he claims it deserves, particularly from the United States (President 
Karimov’s comment on how Uzbekistan’s CSTO membership will be perceived 
on the international stage: "As you know already, today Uzbekistan has become, 
or to be more precise, has restored its membership of the CSTO. This is an 
event which, naturally, will attract the attention of not only those journalists and 
the media present here today but also of those people who are concerned by 
this, including those who are located far away from the territory we are on now."  
(11) 
 
Uzbekistan has been virtually ignored all too often by the powers-that-be in 
Washington, especially during its first few years of post-Soviet independence, 
when President Karimov’s administration was still relatively receptive to Western 
overtures and had not yet adopted the politically repressive policies that 
characterize his regime today.  Although Uzbekistan does not offer the same 
economic opportunities for Western investment that its oil- and gas-rich 
neighbors do, its geographic position and the fact that it remains one of the 
strongest and most politically stable countries in the region give it a very 
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significant role to play in Central Asian geopolitics.  Unfortunately, over the past 
15 years, few US policy-makers seem to have recognized Uzbekistan’s 
geopolitical importance in Central Asia and even fewer have taken steps to 
develop US-Uzbek relations, in order to create a positive environment for US 
investment and influence in Central Asia.  The result is that not only Uzbekistan, 
but also Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have shifted their focus to improving their 
relations with Russia, as well as with China.  In the short-run, allying themselves 
with Russia may bring greater economic, military, and even political benefits to 
the CSTO countries; however, in the long run, there may be a considerable price 
to pay.  Thus far, the Russian government’s goals in Central Asia seem to 
revolve mainly around exploiting its mineral resources and gaining and/or 
retaining control over its oil and gas pipelines, as well as gaining as much sway 
as possible over the Central Asian countries’ foreign policies.  Should Russia 
manage to accomplish these goals, the Central Asian states easily could devolve 
into being little more than Russian colonies. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
What about the Maidan? 
Almost two years ago in Ukraine, up to one million people joined together to 
protest against a regime that had suppressed their freedom, supported a culture 
of deep corruption, rigged an election and been implicated in at least one murder.   
In Independence Square, these people they chanted slogans demanding 
“bandits to jail,” “freedom,” and “Yushchenko – President!”  
 
Their chants followed a presidential election found by all internationally 
accredited election monitoring organizations to be unfair and not free.  During the 
election, then-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich’s government reportedly used 
state resources and well-paid “private” security services to, among other things, 
bribe and intimidate voters, while altering the vote counts in some areas.  
 
After 17 days of protest, the election was invalidated, a new ballot was held, and 
Ukraine welcomed its new President Viktor Yushchenko.  “The people won!” said 
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Anya, after the announcement that Yushchenko had been elected.  “For 70 years 
we were slaves,” said Andriy.  “In 1991, we received freedom on paper, but it 
was still slavery, just different masters.  Now, people want to hold their heads up.  
People want freedom. … This was a victory of the nation.” (1) 
 
What a difference two years make. 
 
On 18 July, Viktor Yanukovich was nominated by the new parliamentary majority 
to return as prime minister.  Since Ukraine has now become a parliamentary-
presidential republic, Yanukovich – the man disgraced, discredited and literally 
chased out of town in 2004 – could now become more powerful than the 
president.  
 
One day later, the bloc of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko walked out of 
parliament in protest, calling on the president to disband the parliament, with the 
members draping their seats with a massive Ukrainian flag as they went. (2) 
 
The return of Yanukovich officially occurred as a result of the disintegration on 7 
July of the “orange coalition of democratic forces,” comprised of the parties that 
had led the revolution protests – Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine, The Yulia 
Tymoshenko Bloc (BYUT) and the Socialist Party.  But it was actually a much 
longer process – beginning in September 2005, when Yushchenko dismissed 
Tymoshenko from her position as prime minister, thus splintering the “orange 
team” – and intensifying after the parliamentary elections of March 2006. 
 
Following the parliamentary elections, the three “orange” parties together could 
have secured a slim majority, and should have been able quickly to put together 
a coalition to create a government.  
 
But the disappointing third place finish of President Yushchenko’s party, following 
a series of (legally unproven) corruption charges against some of the top names 
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on his party’s electoral list, made negotiations difficult.  Neither Yushchenko nor 
his allies appeared able to accept that their party had finished behind the bloc of 
former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko – until then, always a junior ally.  
 
But, in March, Tymoshenko’s calls to clean up corruption and fulfill the “goals of 
the Maidan” (Independence Square), resonated with voters.  Her party’s 22 
percent of the electorate placed it well ahead of the 14 percent gained by 
Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine, and the 5% of the Socialists.  When seats were 
redistributed after subtracting the votes given to parties that did not pass the 
electoral threshold, the three partners would have had a majority of 239 out of 
450 deputies.  
 
Still, Yushchenko and Our Ukraine delayed, seemingly hoping that by postponing 
a coalition agreement, they could extract bigger dividends.  The biggest, of 
course, was the prime minister’s post, which Tymoshenko immediately claimed, 
as the leader of the largest party in the potential coalition.  Our Ukraine officially 
balked, suggesting that their party, as the party of the president, should choose 
the prime minister. 
 
Our Ukraine also undertook “secret” negotiations (although they were reported 
throughout the media and confirmed by individual party members) with the party 
that placed first in the poll– Viktor Yanukovich’s Party of Regions.  Drawing on 
the heavily populated, Russian-speaking Eastern regions of the country, 
Yanukovich’s party received 32 percent of the vote. 
 
The Our Ukraine cat-and-mouse game with BYUT and the Party of Regions 
continued for almost three months, leaving the country with a caretaker 
government.  Clearly, Our Ukraine and the president had a difficult job and a 
difficult choice – one not made easier at all times by the demands of BYUT.  But 
Yushchenko’s delay in choosing to unite with his former revolution partners was 
costly.  By that time, the Party of Regions had badly outmaneuvered the “orange” 
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team.  Regions had gone behind Yushchenko’s back to “steal” the Socialist 
Party.  
 
Just days after Our Ukraine, BYUT and the Socialists announced their “coalition 
of democratic forces,” Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz switched sides and 
joined his party with the Communists and Yanukovich, creating a new majority. 
(3)  From the parliamentary tribune, Tymoshenko claimed that large amounts of 
money had changed hands, while the deputies in her faction chanted, “Moroz is 
Judas!”  Regardless, the “democratic majority” was over before it began. (4) 
 
The episode was oddly and ominously similar to the situation following the 
parliamentary election in 2002.  
 
Then, Our Ukraine, BYUT and the Socialists officially attempted to form a 
majority with certain members of the Communist Party and other unaffiliated 
deputies.  However, throughout the negotiations to form Ukraine’s first ever 
“democratic majority,” Yushchenko also negotiated with then-President Kuchma’s 
United Ukraine Party.  In exchange for a promise to name him prime minister, 
Yushchenko reportedly agreed to work with United Ukraine instead of the 
Socialists and BYUT.  But at the last moment, United Ukraine reneged on its 
promises, used various techniques to convince individual deputies to desert the 
“democratic forces,” and created a majority without Yushchenko, BYUT or the 
Socialists.  
 
“The agreement to appoint Viktor Yushchenko as prime minister was brilliant 
bait,” Yulia Tymoshenko said at the time.  “While the businessmen of United 
Ukraine made a show of discussing details of the agreement with Yushchenko, 
the authorities were actively pulling away people’s deputies from the opposition 
majority.” (5) 
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According to a number of individuals familiar with the negotiations, the Party of 
Regions also used the prime minister position as bait in 2006.  The party 
reportedly said it would allow Our Ukraine to name the prime minister – 
something the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc would not do.  It seems, however, that this 
offer may have been intended to be fulfilled; Yanukovich told several officials 
privately that he had agreed to give up the position.  In the end, Yushchenko 
turned this offer down.  But, it appears that the damage was done. 
 
This damage, ironically, had been predicted by Tymoshenko.  “It would be a 
tragedy,” she said on 29 March, “if we lost the chance to form the coalition of our 
three forces.  All these votes could be lost . . . if we lose time.  . . .  In 2002, we 
lost this chance to create such a coalition.  I don’t want to repeat this mistake and 
these bad results.  I don’t want this to finish the same way.  I appeal to Our 
Ukraine and all the leaders of the bloc not to postpone under any circumstances 
these negotiations.” (6)   
 
At that time, Tymoshenko’s allies privately suggested that representatives from 
the Party of Regions had begun calling individual deputies and offering various 
incentives to leave the coalition.  It appears that, with enough time, these 
incentives worked. 
 
Following the announcement of the new Communist-Socialist-Party of Regions 
majority, several citizens groups set up a new “tent camp” on the Maidan to 
protest a possible government led by Yanukovich, and to urge the president to 
dissolve parliament and call new elections. BYUT and the Ukrainian People’s 
Party (Rukh-Kostenko) quickly joined them.  Our Ukraine did not.  
 
After negotiating again with both BYUT and Regions, Our Ukraine declared itself 
in opposition.   But a number of media reported that negotiations continue with 
Yanukovich, to try to bring Our Ukraine into the government.  “Our Ukraine has 
no right to be in the opposition,” Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk said. “We must 
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influence the process of development of our state whoever the Prime Minister is 
and whatever coalition is formed.” (7) 
 
Our Ukraine’s desire to influence the government makes it unlikely that 
Yushchenko will take the drastic step of dissolving parliament, as BYUT 
suggests.  Even more, Our Ukraine’s poll ratings have slipped considerably since 
March, meaning a new election is likely to diminish the party’s influence further. 
 
In Ukraine, where a central power has always ruled strongly and exclusively, 
there is a limited understanding of an opposition’s role. Nevertheless, a number 
of politicians within the Our Ukraine party – reform-oriented politicians who have 
always supported a “democratic coalition,” and who worked hard to unite the 
parties – has announced its intention to construct a “shadow government.”  Its 
members also are working with BYUT to determine how they will influence and 
monitor the cabinet.  This assumes, of course, that BYUT will return to the 
parliament, and that Our Ukraine will remain in the opposition. 
 
Since the government will likely include a number of individuals previously 
charged with crimes, the monitoring function of the opposition will be essential.  
Should the new “democratic opposition” prove able to effectively monitor and 
influence the government in power, Ukrainians will be able to say that the gains 
of the orange revolution have not disappeared. 
 
BELARUS 
Banking on oil and gas 
Over the last several months, the US and EU repeatedly have criticized 
Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko for holding a fraudulent election, 
jailing political opponents and outlawing public gatherings and protests.  Yet, 
while statements opposing Lukashenko have been numerous, actions have been 
few and ineffective.  This is understandable in a world environment dominated by 
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bombs, civil war and war crimes tribunals.  But it is unfortunate, given the real 
possibility to make a difference in a country bordering the EU. 
 
On 19 March, Belarusians voted in what was deemed by international and 
independent domestic election monitors as an unfair presidential election in an 
environment that was not free.  During the campaign, observers documented 
numerous, flagrant violations of international electoral standards.  Opponents of 
Lukashenko were regularly harassed; they were not allowed to hold rallies or 
meet groups of voters numbering more than ten; they were investigated by 
police; they were beaten; they were arrested.  The media were – and are – 
entirely censored.  Election observers themselves were arrested or deported.  In 
short, the atmosphere provided no choice – except that imposed by the 
government. 
 
Throughout the campaign, EU and US representatives threatened punitive 
measures if the election was found to fall short of accepted election standards 
and practices – standards Belarus agreed to follow when it became a member of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
 
Following the election, the EU, the US, Canada and a number of other countries, 
announced travel bans against dozens of Belarusian officials.   The EU also 
prohibited "persons who are responsible for the violations of international 
electoral standards and the crackdown on civil society and the democratic 
opposition" from accessing bank accounts or resources on EU territory. (8)  One 
month ago, the US followed suit.  In his letter to Congress announcing the 
banking freeze, President George Bush wrote, "There is simply no place in a 
Europe whole and free for a regime of this kind."  (9) 
 
Lukashenko laughed.  He had no bank accounts in the EU or US, he said, and 
offered a reward to anyone who could prove he did.  (10) 
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In fact, experts suggest that any money held by Lukashenko outside of Belarus 
likely is kept not in the West, but in places like Cyprus and the Pacific island of 
Nauru, which have long been favorites of the former Soviet elite.    This is 
perhaps why Belarus' most popular opposition politician, Aleksandr Milinkevich, 
praised the sanctions for creating "serious moral pressure," but stopped short of 
suggesting they would have any practical effect. (11) 
 
His caution seems to have been justified.  Despite the warnings and sanctions, 
over 1,000 opposition activists and election monitors were arrested in the months 
following the election and sentenced to anywhere from days to years in prison. 
 
On 13 July, Aleksandr Kozulin, one of Lukashenko's opponents in the election, 
was sentenced to more than 5 years in prison for "aggressive hooliganism" and 
"organizing disturbances."  Those disturbances were peaceful demonstrations 
against an oppressive and unbalanced electoral environment. "I think this is 
revenge against a man who dared to say the truth at the moment of the election," 
Milinkevich said following the sentencing. (12)  Milinkevich himself was released 
from prison in May after a 15 day jail sentence. (13) 
 
So, if the current sanctions are having no effect, what can be done? 
 
First, the EU could remove Belarus from its General Customs Preferences 
System (GPS).  This provides preferential import duties for "developing nations," 
and reportedly saves Belarus 300 million euros every year.  Yet, despite threats 
to remove this preferential treatment, the EU left it in place until at least 
September, when it will be reconsidered. 
 
Belarus' neighbors reportedly expressed concern over how the removal of the 
GPS from Belarus would impact the balance of trade between their countries. 
However, the abandonment of a sanction that would have had a measurable 
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practical effect no doubt sent a powerful message to Lukashenko about the EU's 
commitment to the cause of human rights in his country. 
 
Second, the EU could restructure how it deals with the question of Belarusian oil.  
Last year, the Bratislava-based Pontis Foundation completed an examination of 
Belarus' energy market in relation to its economy, and found that Belarusian 
authorities and government-owned businesses make considerable profits by 
importing Russian oil into Belarus at bargain prices and then exporting it to the 
EU at market – or just below market – prices. 
 
These contracts with the EU are reportedly worth up to 3.3 billion euros each 
year and allow Lukashenko to maintain his country at a minimum subsistence 
level. Russia's agreement to maintain Belarusian oil prices well below market 
price is the main reason that Lukashenko can maintain power and avoid the 
economic reforms that would bring his country closer to Western standards. 
 
Pegging the price of the oil it imports from Belarus to the price paid by Belarus to 
Russia could strike a direct blow against the Minsk government.  The EU is 
hesitant to take such a drastic step, and cautions against taking actions that 
would harm the population.  Officials also no doubt are concerned about their oil 
supplies, and wonder about the response of Russia. 
 
In fact, Belarus avoids the negative economic effects of its current isolation 
thanks to massive Russian subsidies of oil, gas and food products, among other 
categories.   Although Western officials have asked Russia to end this support for 
Belarus, the country has never truly been pressured on this point. 
 
Still, it is unlikely that Russian officials, who have become steadily more irritated 
at Lukashenko's actions, would further jeopardize already difficult relations with 
the West for Lukashenko when faced with a unified, determined EU front.  
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Already, Russia is slightly shifting its Belarus policy by demanding higher prices 
for gas. 
 
Therefore, as Russia lessens some of its subsidies to Belarus, it may be the 
opportune moment for the EU to do the same.  Otherwise, Lukashenko can 
continue to enjoy bantering back and forth with Western officials over his policies, 
secure in the belief that it will never develop into anything more. 
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